Introduction
The Salafi movement has long been identified with extremism and violence. Yet, it is far from being homogeneous. It is a large and acephalous movement with many different variations 2 that has spread across the Muslim world (Cavatorta 2015; Meijer 2009 ). It has been claimed that there are three subgroups of Salafis: the purists, the jihadis, and the politicos (Wiktorowicz 2007, 207) . Each one has its own strategy and agenda, although the common goal is to live under Sharia.
Many Salafis have engaged only in da'wa (call to Islam) and education activities, while attempting to purify Islam from its non-Islamic elements; other Salafis have engaged in jihadi activities against foreign powers or fellow Muslims; and some others believe that the Salafi movement can play role in the political life of a country.
Salafi parties have been established in post-Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia participating in
elections. Yet, most Salafis have typically rejected democracy as a man-made system that goes against the tenets of the Muslim faith. From their point of view, Sharia is a God-given code of laws that human beings must always follow. Democracy is immoral because man does not abide by God's rules and becomes ignorant of his duties. Indeed, several Salafi scholars have openly condemned democracy and elections. For instance, Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, one of the most important Salafi scholars, argued that 'elections according to democracy are unlawful, and parliaments that do not govern in accordance with the Quran and the Sunnah, but rather on the basis of the majority's arbitrariness, are tyrannical' (Rabil 2014, 37) . However, the article will claim that some Salafis now see elections as a method to advance their faith-based agenda which aims at the establishment of a Sharia-ruled society. For this purpose, they have utilized the master frame of democracy. More specifically, they have framed their political struggle as part of the democratization process following the Arab Spring revolutions. The article will first describe the master frame of democracy. Then it will examine the rise of al-Nour party in Egypt. Also, it will describe the emergence of electoral Salafis in 3 neighbouring Tunisia. Finally, it will analyse how electoral Salafis have applied the democracy master frame to their local political environments.
The master frame of democracy
The Muslim world has experimented with democracy for more than one hundred years.
The Ottoman Empire initiated some democratic reforms in the last quarter of the 19 th century. The of Islamist movements have long since reached the conclusion that democratization is the best overall vehicle by which to present their agenda to the public and to gain political influence and 4 thereby eventually to come to power ' (Fuller 2003, 29 Democracy is not only a popular political system, but also a powerful master frame.
Framing theory has explored how social movements construct and disseminate messages to mobilize supporters. According to Erving Goffman, frame is an interpretive schema through which information is encountered and processed (Goffman 1974) . In effect, it constitutes a form of discourse that draws on shared meanings (Hunt et al 1994) . A master frame is a set of meanings that enjoys even broader popular resonance (Snow and Benford 1992) . According to Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston, 'movement participants draw upon master frames to portray their perceived injustice in ways that fit the tenor of the times and thus parallels other movements ' (Oliver and Johnston 2005, 189) . Therefore, master frames tend to be as generic as possible because only then they can be used by many aggrieved groups (Carroll and Ratner 1996, 602-603) . Social movements would adopt those master frames that resonate with the culture and situation of potential sympathizers. They are usually transmitted through the media, conversations, speeches, slogans, 5 and visual representations (e.g. photos) (Johnson 2002, 66) . Therefore, the concept of master frame places more emphasis on strategies rather than value orientations of social movements (Turner 1994, 79) .
The master frame of democracy has been utilized by many groups and parties all around the world. According to Thomas Olesen, the dominance of the democracy master frame is connected to the end of the Cold War (Olesen 2005, 56) . In particular, the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 in East Europe appropriated the democracy master frame that had been first advanced by the Solidarity movement in Poland (McAdam 1996, 49) . During the mid-1990s, the revolutionary movement of Zapatistas managed to frame its uprising for the rights of the indigenous population in the Mexican province of Chiapas as part of a global drive for democratization (Mann 2015, 115) . The master frame of democracy was used by disability groups during protests in Egypt in 2010 and 2011 to promote equality among citizens (Barnartt 2014, 67-78) . Due to its widespread application, it is subject to localized interpretations. In other words, it has a high degree of flexibility and variability in accordance to particular political and cultural conditions.
The democracy master frame consists of three main components. First, it includes the principle of political equality which can be summarized as 'one person one vote'. In a proper democratic system, the whole adult population can participate in free, fair and periodic elections. But other scholars have viewed this shift as a tactical rather than strategic decision. According to Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, 'their transformation stems more from political expediency than a natural ideological evolution. As a result, their commitment to the democratic process is tenuous ' (Bokhari and Senzai 2013, 93) . Whatever the case may be, the decision to participate in elections is of great significance because it creates a political precedent for the future of Salafism.
In the Al-Nour has tried hard to survive politically in the post-coup political order in Egypt.
Hence it has declared itself not a religious party, but as a party that is based on religion. In this way, its leaders have hoped to avoid the constitutional prohibition on religious parties. They have argued that the party is 'consistent with the rules of the constitution and political parties' law' (Bayoumi 2014) . Also, the party seeks to guarantee fundamental rights within the framework of Sharia, including rule of law, freedom of speech, and freedom of association (Jung 2012, 3). While not abandoning the goal of adopting Sharia as the law of the land, al-Nour has campaigned for democracy and civil liberties. Thus, it can present itself as part of the pro-democracy movement in Egypt.
In any case, the participation of Salafis in the Egyptian political system constitutes an important departure from their previous isolationist stance. They constitute a relatively Finally, the democracy master frame has the powerful component of political legitimacy that offers Salafis recognition and acceptance for being part of the party system. Hence they can gain more legitimacy in the eyes of the general public that has been sceptical or even hostile toward them and become more attractive to potential allies. Indeed, this component has allowed the formation of broader political alliances with parties and groups that do not share the core values of Salafism. As it has already been mentioned, al-Nour has cooperated with socialist parties in the Egyptian parliament and the Reform Front has maintained a close relationship with al-Nahda (Schwedler 2007; Karakayaa and Yildirim 2013) . The use of this component can also deter state repression because it raises the political cost of confronting Salafis. However, Salafis are free riding on democracy. They do not contribute much to the democratic politics, but they still enjoy 22 the legitimacy that comes with it. It follows that having political legitimacy can become an instrument to undermine adversaries who oppose Salafi demands.
Still the endorsement of the democracy master frame by Salafis in Egypt and Tunisia represents a significant development that differentiates them from their counterparts in other Muslim-majority countries. The adopted frame has led to the socialization of Salafis into new political cultures which include elements of pluralism. Although the master frame has been used selectively by Salafis to reach out to pious Muslims, it has also enforced on them new norms of conduct and behaviour. In effect, the master frame of democracy has encouraged participation, accountability and consensus-building.
The organization of electoral campaigns, the drafting of the party's list of candidates in accordance to state laws, and frequent interactions with the media have shaped the political behaviour of Salafi actors. As a result, Salafis must abide by the constitution and the laws that they seek to change. They must take into account not only other political forces, but also the public opinion. One may claim that their endorsement of democracy is not genuine, since Salafis support political pluralism only if this serves their political goals. 
Conclusion

